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OBSERVATIONS ON THE POLICY OF THE
BRICKER AMENDMENT*
CLAUDE PEPPER"

In this critical period, when our national and personal security and
manner of life depend so much upon our relations with other nations
and peoples of the world, many senators, organizations, and individuals
of eminence propose an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States relative to the powers of the President and the Congress in the
making of treaties and executive agreements. Both its advocates and
its opponents describe it as the most important change in the Constitution offered since the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Such a matter
is of especial interest and, I hope, of concern to all lawyers, not only
as individuals but also as leaders of public opinion in the sphere of
the law.
The amendment is generally associated with the name of Senator
Bricker of Ohio, who introduced a proposed amendment in the 82nd
Congress and again in January 1953 in the 83rd Congress; but the
version of an amendment reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary
Committee last June is really more like the amendment proposed by
Senator Watkins of Utah in February 1953, which in part at least was
in accord with the recommendation of the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association. This group, at the recent meeting in
Boston, reaffirmed its position, partially because it felt bound by its
previous stand; but the vote on the subject in the assembly revealed
that the opponents of the proposal were gaining in strength in the
association.
*This article is adapted, with only slight modification, from the address delivered October 24, 1953, at the Phi Alpha Delta breakfast during the Centennial
Homecoming of the University of Florida. Regardless of the fate of this proposed
amendment in the current Congress, the policy issues underlying it are by no
means dead, if indeed they are fully dormant in any real sense. We are accordingly
publishing this article as an able presentation of the arguments against, and of
some of the arguments for, the basic theory involved, without, of course, taking
any position on the author's conclusions.
"*Claude Denson Pepper, A.B. 1921, University of Alabama; LL.B. 1924, Harvard
Law School; Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, 1924-1925; United States
Senator from Florida, 1936-1950; Delegate from United States Senate to Interparliamentary Union, The Hague, 1938; Member of Florida and District of Columbia
Bars.
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Frank E. Holman, of Portland, Oregon, a former president of
the American Bar Association, has spearheaded the fight for the
amendment, which has the militant support of many organizations
and citizens of repute and prestige in this country. It is vigorously
opposed, however, by the President, by the Secretary of State, who
spoke strongly against it to the American Bar Association convention
in Boston, by an impressive list of law school deans, professors of
constitutional law and practitioners, including John W. Davis, the
acknowledged dean of the United States Bar, and by many citizens.
I should like to consider briefly what is proposed by such an amendment, why the advocates are seeking a change in the Constitution,
and what the opponents of the proposal say, and to suggest a policy
that I believe better suited to the demands of this crucial era.
The Constitution of the United States provides that it itself,
statutes enacted pursuant thereto, and treaties executed under the
authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land.' The
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, has
authority to make treaties. The approval of two thirds of the senators
present and voting, assuming a quorum to be present, is required in
order to give this advice and consent on the part of the Senate.2 By
implication from the terms of the Constitution the President also has
authority to make executive agreements with foreign powers.
Executive agreements are of three kinds: those made pursuant to
an act of Congress, those entered into and subsequently ratified or
authorized by an act of Congress, and those reached by the President
without any congressional authority.
Senator Bricker and his supporters would write five material
changes into the Constitution. These are:
(1) A treaty provision that conflicts with the Constitution
shall have no effect.
(2) A treaty shall become effective as domestic law only when
it is duly enacted by legislation.
(3) This legislation must be of such a nature that it would
be valid if enacted without any relation to a treaty.
(4) Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and
other agreements with any foreign power.
(5) Such agreements shall have no effect as internal law
'U.S. CONST. Art. VI, di. 2.
21d. Art. II, §2, cd. 2.
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unless given effect by Congress in the form of duly enacted
legislation that would be valid if not related to an agreement
with a foreign power.

One quite naturally asks what is behind the widespread agitation
and deep feeling for such an amendment to the Constitution, which
has withstood in its present basic form the storms and tides of 165
years. The motivations of the advocates seem to lie in fears stirred from
four sources: executive agreements such as those of Teheran, Yalta,
and Potsdam; the numerous conventions proposed by the United
Nations;3 the 1920 decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Missouri v. Holland4 relative to migratory birds; and the
recent holding of the California District Court of Appeal in Sei Fujii
v. California5 that Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter,
dealing with human rights, invalidated a provision in the California
land law forbidding a Japanese to own land in that state.
These instances and decisions move Senator Bricker and those with
him, so they -tell us, to fear that, if the Constitution is not clarified as
they propose, the President, or the President and two thirds of the
senators, or the President and the Congress, will from time to time
strangle the liberties of the people and undermine the institutions
of the republic.
These are serious charges. But what do the President, the eminent
lawyer who is Secretary of State, the able committee on international
and comparative law of the American Bar Association, the distinguished group of deans and professors of law, and Mr. Davis and the
other citizens of high patriotism and repute opposing the proposed
change say to these alarms? They believe, as I do, that the legal and
practical safeguards of our liberties and institutions under our present
constitutional provisions are quite adequate, as proven by the experience of nearly 165 years in which none of the calamities that they
contemplate has come to pass. They further believe that this present
period, in which our nation is the hope of peace and freedom for
mankind, is no time to weaken the power of our government to
mobilize our friends or master our enemies.
The opponents also emphasize that the first provision in the pro3E.g., genocide, human rights, and some 200 others.

4252 U.S. 416 (1920).
5217 P.2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950). But cf. 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (U.N.
Charter held not to be self-executing).
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posed amendment, namely, that any treaty provision in conflict with
the Constitution shall be void, is totally unnecessary because that is
the law now as declared by the United States Supreme Court in at
least four cases since 1853.
For example, in Doe v. Bradeno the Supreme Court said: "The
treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority, and the courts
of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions,
unless they violate the Constitution of the United States."
Although such an amendment would consist of words harmless
in themselves in view of such decisions, yet it is dangerous to amend
the Constitution to accomplish a useless purpose. The painful experience of government under the Articles of Confederation, which
lacked the treaty-making power, prompted the framers of the Constitution to incorporate the present provision. Some meaning seriously
impairing this important power might be read into such amendment.
Missouri v. Holland7 does not impair what I have said or justify
the fears that this opinion has aroused in the advocates of this amendment. In 1913 Congress passed an act regulating the shooting of migratory birds in order to protect their dwindling number.8 Two lower federal courts held this act invalid on the ground that the power to regulate the shooting of game is reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment. 9 Thereafter the United States and Canada executed a
treaty providing that each country should enact legislation protecting
migratory birds flying between the two countries.1 Congress passed an
act carrying out the treaty;- Missouri challenged its validity. The Supreme Court upheld the act on the ground that the treaty was lawful
as the exercise by the Federal Government of a duly delegated power
to enter into treaties and that the act properly implemented the treaty.
The Supreme Court in 1941, in United States v. Darby, 2 declared the
same principle in holding that when the Federal Government exercises
the commerce power under the Constitution it does not invade the

616 How. 635, 656 (U.S. 1853).
7252 U.S. 416 (1920).
837 STAT. 847 (1913).
OUnited States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v.
Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
lOTreaty of August 16, 1916, between the United States and Great Britain, 39
STAT. 1702 (1916), found under Treaties and Conventions 95.
"140 STAT. 755 (1918), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §703 (Supp. 1952).
12312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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reserved powers of the states under the Tenth Amendment even though
intrastate business is collaterally affected.
The Supreme Court might well have upheld the original act of
Congress protecting birds flying between states or countries. I think
it would surely so hold in a similar case today. But dearly Missouri
v. Holland does not give the Federal Government under the treaty
provision the power to violate another part of the Constitution. On
the contrary, Mr. Justice Holmes, who spoke for the Court, said: "We
do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treatymaking power .... The treaty in question does not contravene any
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution."13 Remembering
that this is the fourth case in which the Supreme Court has said the
same thing, it would not seem necessary to write that principle further
into the Constitution.
You see, then, that the second provision in the proposed amend.
ment, namely, that a treaty shall not have effect as internal law until
the Congress so enacts, is an attempt to impair the power to execute
a treaty that is self-executing, as many treaties are. It is, further, an
effort to go back to the days of the Articles of Confederation and require the concurrence of the states in the treaty-making process; this
concurrence obviously would be necessary if the theory of the advocates of this amendment that the power to regulate internal matters
is a power reserved exclusively to the states under the Tenth Amendment is correct.
As a result the United States could not enter into a treaty to give
reciprocal rights to citizens of this country and of other countries, or
to regulate trade and commerce, customs, narcotics, atomic power
production and facilities, and many other subjects without concurring
legislation on the part of the states. This procedure would add not
only a second step to the treaty-making process but possibly fortyeight additional steps and unpredictable delays. It would take us back
to the time of the inability of the national government to get the states
to carry out treaties; yet this weakness was one of the principal reasons for calling for the Constitutional Convention and writing the
provision that ".

.

. all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under

the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... "14
That this measure now proposed might well be called a states'
13252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
14U.S. CONsT. Art. VI, cd. 2.
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rights amendment is emphasized by its third provision, namely, that
no treaty shall have effect as internal law until it is duly enacted as
legislation and that such legislation must be valid without any
reference to treaty-making power. Under this provision even Congress
could not implement a treaty unless such legislation came under some
expressly delegated power in the Constitution or the "necessary and
proper" clause.' 5 One wonders whether the real purpose of this proposed amendment is not to curb what these advocates regard as too
much "internationalism" and "nationalism" -whether, in short, the
purpose of the amendment is not more to write a political philosophy
than a legal safeguard for our liberties and institutions into the
Constitution.
If this aim were the real purpose of this great effort it should be
recognized that the Supreme Court has held in the Head Money Cases 6
and others that the effect of any treaty as internal law can be defeated
or modified by an act of Congress. Of course, treaties must always deal
with matters that are properly the subjects of international agreements; and the courts are open to review any abuse of the treaty
power by the Government, just as they are authorized to pass upon
any other authority asserted under the Constitution.
The fears aroused by the California lower court decision in the
Sei Fujii case,' 7 holding a provision of the United Nations Charter
self-executing, should have been allayed by the decision of the Supreme
Court of California that these charter provisions are not selfexecuting.' s No court of last resort to my knowledge has held to the
contrary.
Further, it is elementary that the conventions proposed by the
United Nations have no internal effect until negotiated by the President and ratified by the Senate as treaties or by the Congress. They
are not self-executing.
The provision of the proposed amendment that Congress shall
have power to regulate all executive and other agreements strikes at
the presidential power to act for the nation abroad and ignores the
power Congress already has relative to most executive agreements.
So-called executive agreements, as distinguished from treaties, 19 are
I, §8, cl. 18.
16112 U.S. 580 (1884).
17217 P.2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950).
1838 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
leAdmittedly no clear title of demarcation has been drawn.
15U.S. CoNsr. Art.
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of three classes: those made by the President by the authority of
Congress; those executed by the President and ratified or recognized
by the Congress; and those entered into by the President without
authorization, ratification, or recognition by the Congress.
An executive agreement that is not authorized by Congress and
that conflicts with a former statute is invalid.20 And a subsequent
statute may of course void any kind of executive agreement as internal
21
law, just as it may invalidate as internal law a provision of a treaty.
It would seem, therefore, that the necessity of congressional concurrence, express or actual, and the reserved power of congressional
veto would be adequate safeguards respecting the so-called statutory
executive agreements; and these make up 85 percent of the some 170
formal agreements our Government is making each year. The precise
scope of the power of the President under the Constitution to act in
respect to foreign affairs without the concurrence of Congress has never
been defined and can probably never be spelled out in specific terms
terms because of the duties and powers he has under the Constitution and the varied and challenging demands he must meet to protect and to promote the interests of the country.
At the 1933 American Bar Association Convention Judge Parker,
the senior circuit judge in the United States, quoted former Secretary
of War Royal as saying that, if he had had to submit to Congress the
agreement he made in the early hours of the morning with France and
Britain respecting the Berlin airlift, that great and saving program
would have been impossible. Furthermore, since the Steel Seizure
Cases22 there can be no doubt about the power of the courts to review
any assertion of power by the President.
I have thus far dealt with the legal aspects of the proposed amendment and have endeavored to make it clear that the safeguards of the
Constitution, the Congress, and the courts, which have proven bulwarks of the people's liberties and our democratic institutions for
nearly one and two-thirds centuries, through all the vicissitudes of
war and peace, are still safe citadels of security in the present and foreseeable future. In addition to these legal safeguards, there are practical assurances which are equally important and, I believe, sufficient.
Our presidents are nominated by conventions and elected by the
people; they are subject to impeachment. Experience has proved that
2oUnited States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953).
2lHead Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
22343

U.S. 579 (1952).
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they are men of patriotism and integrity, devoted to our way of life and
responsive not only to the restraints of congressional power and law
but of public opinion as well. The House and one third of the Senate
are elected every two years. We have an alert and militant press, an
informed and articulate public opinion.
I should add references to the existence of an institution of which
we Southerners are particularly aware, the power of filibuster in the
Senate. Under this recognized and protected Senate practice a small
group of senators - and surely if, from any source exercising the treaty
or executive agreement-making power, there came a real threat to our
liberties, a few patriotic and understanding senators could be counted
upon - can by prolonged speech prevent any action by the Senate
either toward ratifying a treaty or in any way supporting or recognizing
an executive agreement of any character. To stop such a filibuster, since
the Wherry Amendment, the affirmative vote of 64 senators, two thirds
of all elected, is required. So, in case of any abuse of presidential or
congressional power, the capacity of a very few senators to require the
affirmative vote of 64 senators to any treaty or executive agreement adds
further strength to the practical safeguards we possess againt the invasion of our fundamental rights under our Constitution as it has
stood for 165 years without the Bricker Amendment.
The example of France, whose insecurity is a threat to our own
safety because of the weakness of its government in this tumultuous
time, should serve to warn us against emasculating our own government, which has such fearful responsibility for the peace and progress
of the world. If the amendment proposed comes from conscientious
fears about the legal inadequacy of our present constitutional and legal
safeguards, I submit that those fears are ill-founded. Of course, if this
amendment agitation is a disguised effort to write into our Constitution
the political philosophy of extreme conservatives and isolationists,
then the effort should be met in the political forum and the full import and significance of what these earnest citizens would fasten upon
our Constitution and upon us and our future should be made crystal
clear to the Congress and the country.
I believe reflection will show that the wiser course would be to
urge the President, the Senate and House, and an enlightened public
all to work together as an effective team to meet and to master the
menace that threatens us today. This course is more desirable than
tampering with our Constitution, weakening our executive or the
Congress, and indicating distrust in them, our courts, and our
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people. This is essentially what Secretary Dulles said in the congressional hearing on the Bricker Amendment. It is basically what Mr.
Justice Jackson stated in his able concurring opinion in the Steel
Seizure Cases.2 3 It was the practice of President Roosevelt and the
subject of the last correspondence, written rather informally, that I
had with him just before his death. In the course of this correspondence I had occasion to make the following observations:
"Since I have been in the Senate I have done what I could
to get the Senate to appreciate that it did have a joint responsibility with the President for our foreign policy and to stimulate
it to discharge that responsibility fully.
"The practice of the Senate too often and too long has
been not to discharge fully its responsibility with the Executive respecting our foreign policy. I consider it to be the duty of
the necessary party to the consummation of a treaty, to give the
negotiating party, in this case the Executive, some dependable
indication as to the general policy it will support before negotiations are undertaken.
"I consider it also to be the duty of such a necessary party
to advise the negotiating party, if its advice is required, even
during negotiations, what its general views are and what in
general it would do. On the contrary, the Senate has too often
declined to take any such responsibility and has waited for the
negotiations to be concluded, the conference to be broken up,
with the settlement of world affairs of the greatest moment in
suspense, and then has gone casually about the examination of
the treaty negotiated by the Executive, treating it with little
more earnestness or diligence than they [sic] would an ordinary bill.
"If our constitutional provision is to remain as it is and
the Senate is the final authority upon the ratification of treaties
the Senate has got to be more ready to give its advice than it has
been in the past or our Government shall not have the power
to make prompt decisions, which I believe to be so essential
to a sound foreign policy in the modem world."
The President, in one of his last letters, dated April 9, 1945, replied
as follows:
23Id. at 634.
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"I like what you say and it is perfectly clear that fundamentally you and I mean exactly the same thing. As a matter
of fact, while in questions of foreign policy the President ought
to do the spade work of negotiations and the original nominating of certain officers, a long experience leads me to recognize
that the Senate ought to be consulted both on the policy and
some of the nominations. Both you and I know that as a matter
of practice too much consultation would slow up both matters."
By such cooperation we can show to the backward-looking totalitarians and tyrants that democracy not only can but does work and
that free men working together in free nations and a world of expanding freedom will yet bring to pass that happy day, to which I
heard Mr. Justice Jackson refer in delivering his great opening speech
at the Nuremberg Trials in 1945, "when every man shall live by no
man's leave underneath the law."
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